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Net Intergenerational Transfers from an Increase in Social Security Benefits 





When the age of death is uncertain, individuals will leave bequests—even if they have no 
desired bequests—simply because they will hold wealth against the possibility of living 
longer. Bequests are accidental. Starting from a baseline level of Social Security benefits, 
an increase in benefits will cause consumption to increase. However, consumption may 
not increase by as much as the increase in Social Security, which would cause wealth to 
be greater than under the baseline scenario. The higher wealth levels would translate into 
greater bequests. Therefore, an increase in Social Security benefits may not be a complete 
transfer from the younger generation to the older generation: some of the increase in 
benefits may be bequeathed back to the younger generation. Whether this happens 
depends on the form of the utility function, the amount of bequeathable wealth, and 
whether there is a bequest motive. The objective of this paper is to quantify for single 
persons how much of an increase in Social Security benefits would be bequeathed back to 
the younger generation. We find that, at least for singles, increases in Social Security 
benefits are unlikely to be offset by bequests.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When the age of death is uncertain, individuals will leave bequests—even if they have no 
desired bequests—simply because they will hold wealth against the possibility of living 
longer. Bequests are accidental. Starting from a baseline level of Social Security benefits, 
an increase in benefits will cause consumption to increase. However, consumption may 
not increase by as much as the increase in Social Security, which would cause wealth to 
be greater than under the baseline scenario. The higher wealth levels would translate into 
greater bequests, even when there is no bequest motive and all bequests are accidental. 
Therefore, an increase in Social Security benefits may not be a complete transfer from the 
younger generation to the older generation: some of the increase in benefits may be 
bequeathed back to the younger generation. Whether this happens depends on the form of 
the utility function, the amount of bequeathable wealth, and whether there is a bequest 
motive. The objective of this paper is to quantify how much of an increase in Social 
Security benefits would be bequeathed back to the younger generation. We will use an 





A broad characterization of the situation at retirement is the following. People reach 
retirement with an array of economic resources: a claim on Social Security, a claim on 
Medicare, pension rights, and bequeathable wealth. An appropriate theoretical framework 
to analyze this situation is the life-cycle model of consumption that goes back to 
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), with extensions to account for a bequest motive (Hurd 
1989). In life-cycle models of consumption under uncertainty, individuals make choices 
in the current period based on current information and beliefs so as to maximize the 
expected discounted present value of utility. The expected discounted present value of 
utility is the sum of utility in the current period based on current choices and the current 
state of the world, and the expected discounted present value of future utility, which 
depends on the probability of survival to each future period, the return to saving, budget 
                                                 
1 A similar model for couples is much more complex and will be an objective of future work.   3
constraints, optimal consumption choices at each period in the future, and the value of 
financial bequests at the death.  
We base the analysis on a somewhat restricted version of the life-cycle model. 
Life-time utility is based on time-separable utility from consumption and from bequests 
(Yaari 1965); the only uncertainty is date of death; resources are initial bequeathable 
wealth, rights to pensions, and a stream of annuities, such as Social Security; 
bequeathable wealth cannot become negative and, therefore, borrowing against future 
annuities is not allowed. Because it does not have a provision for the choice to work, it is 
applicable only to respondents after they enter retirement or disability.  
 
MODEL OF CONSUMPTION BY SINGLES 
 
These assumptions lead to the following behavioral model for a single person: maximize 
expected lifetime utility Ω over the consumption path { t c } 
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The first term is expected discounted utility from consumption, where 
  () u ⋅= the utility flow from consumption; 
  ρ =the subjective time rate of discount;  
  t a =the probability of being alive at t; and 
  N =the maximum remaining years of life (0 ) N a =  
The second term is the expected discounted utility of bequests, where  () V ⋅ = utility from 
bequests, which may depend on the personal characteristics of potential inheritors, such 
as the economic status of any children in an altruistic or strategic bequest model;  
  t w = bequeathable wealth at t; 
  t m = probability density of dying at t.  
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The constraints on the maximization are: initial bequeathable wealth,  0 w , is given; the 
nonnegativity constraint,  0 t wt ≥∀ ; and the rate at which bequeathable wealth changes 
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in which r =  real interest rate (constant and known), and t A = flow of annuities at time t.  
The nonnegativity constraint on bequeathable wealth can be justified by a legal 
ban on borrowing against Social Security benefits. In addition, in the data, very few are 
observed with negative wealth, and those few tend to have negative wealth as the result 
of negative business wealth. This is likely to be the result of unanticipated losses rather 
than borrowing for consumption purposes. The importance of taking account of the 
corner solution ( 0 t w = ) is seen from the fraction of single elderly with approximately 
zero nonhousing wealth. In 1993, about 19 percent of those aged 70–79 and about 40 
percent of those aged 90–100 had wealth of less than $1,000.  
The model places considerable emphasis on annuity income, which is based on 
the empirical observation of its importance. In 1994, 94 percent of the elderly (65 or 
over) had some annuity or pension income (including Social Security) and 79 percent had 
more than half of their income from annuities or pensions. 
The solution to the single’s problem is (Hurd 1989): 
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where  0 w  is given and: 
  ( ) tt t ud u cd c ==  marginal utility of consumption at time t;  
  tt t hm a ==  mortality risk (mortality hazard) at time t; and 
  ( ) tt t Vd V wd w ==  marginal utility of bequests at time t. 
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The model does not admit an analytical solution because of the boundary 
condition and because of the bequest motive. The optimal consumption path must be 
found numerically. Conditional on the specification of the utility function, the equation of 
motion of consumption is given implicitly by [3], and the level is found from the lifetime 
budget constraint. 
A typical solution, as found in prior estimation based on the Retirement History 
Survey (Hurd 1989), is shown in Figure 1. This is the consumption path for a man aged 
75 years with initial bequeathable wealth of $100,000 and Social Security income of 
$10,000. By age 92, all bequeathable wealth has been consumed and the consumption 
path will follow the path of Social Security.  
Once the optimal consumption path has been found, predicted wealth { ˆ w} is 
calculated from the equation of motion of wealth                         [2]. Therefore, for each 
individual the model can be used to forecast consumption and wealth. Income can be 
forecast from observed annuity income and from capital income as  t rw .  
 
ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL 
 
In previous work we have estimated the model of consumption by singles (Gan, Gong, 
Hurd, and McFadden 2004). We specified that the utility function is the constant relative 
risk aversion utility function: 
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and that the bequest function is: 
  01 () ( ) Vw nw α α = +  
if n, the number of children, is positive; otherwise  () 0 Vw= . We estimated this model 
over two waves of data from the Asset and Health Dynamics study (AHEAD).
2 
  An important determinant of the consumption path is mortality risk,  t h , in [3]. 
While prior work simply used life tables to construct  t h  for each individual, we use 
individual reports on subjective survival probabilities (Hurd and McGarry 1995, 2002). A 
subjective survival probability as measured in AHEAD is a respondent’s estimate of the 
                                                 
2 See Soldo, Hurd, Rodgers, and Wallace (1997) for a description of AHEAD.   6
probability of surviving to a “target” age. For example, a 71 year-old would be asked 
about his or her subjective probability of surviving to age 85, while a 77 year-old would 
be asked about survival to age 90. Following Gan, Hurd, and McFadden (2005), we 
estimated individualized survivor curves that depend on both the life table and on 
subjective survival. Briefly, we used a statistical method to combine them such that 
someone who reported subjective survival chances greater than the life table survival 
chances at the target age would be given an individualized survival curve that is greater 
than the life table curve at all ages. In our estimation at each age,  t h  depended on the 
individualized survival curve. 
  Our preferred estimation results produced the parameter values conditional on an 
assumed real interest rate of 0.04, as shown in Table 1. These differ from those in Hurd 





Our model solves for the optimal consumption path, conditional on initial bequeathable 
wealth, Social Security benefits (Social Security wealth), age, sex, and the number of 
children. Then, using the equation of motion of wealth, we find the optimal path of 
bequeathable wealth. From these paths we can calculate the expected present value of 
consumption and of Social Security benefits (Social Security wealth). A bequest happens 
when someone dies holding wealth. The expected bequest at some future time, τ , 
conditional on surviving to time, t, is just wm τ τ , that is, wealth held at τ times the 
probability of dying at τ . The expected present value of bequests is just the discounted 
sum of the wm τ τ . From these calculations we form a lifetime balance sheet. On the 
receipt side, there is initial bequeathable wealth plus Social Security wealth; on the 
expenditure side, there is the expected present value of consumption and the expected 
present value of bequests.  
  Figure 2 shows the consumption and wealth paths for a single woman initially 
aged 65. Her initial bequeathable wealth is $100,000 and Social Security income is   7
$10,000. The consumption path in this figure differs from the consumption path in Figure 
1 because it pertains to a woman aged 65 and because it is based on the parameters in 
Table 1 of Gan et al. (2004).  
  Our method of finding the effect of changes of Social Security on bequests is to 
first conduct a simulation such as that which produced the wealth and consumption paths 
in Figure 2. Then we resimulated the model, but increasing Social Security benefits by 
some given amount. A comparison of the change in the expected present value of 
bequests, the expected present value of consumption, and Social Security wealth will 
show how much of the increase has been used for bequests and for consumption. 
  Figure 3 shows an example of these simulations. The baseline or initial simulation 
is for a woman aged 65 with three children. The parameters are from Table 1 (Hurd 
1989). The baseline wealth, consumption, and Social Security benefits paths are shown in 
the thicker lines. Baseline Social Security is $10,000 per year; baseline initial wealth is 
$100,000. Baseline initial consumption is about $12,900 per year and increases to 
$17,100 at age 81 and then declines until age 94 when wealth is exhausted. After this age, 
she would consume $10,000. Wealth declines continuously until age 94 when it reaches 
zero. Under this scenario expected bequests are $30,200. 
  The simulation results with Social Security benefits of $20,000 are shown in the 
thin lines. Initial consumption is $21,000 under this scenario. It increases until age 82 
after which it declines until age 93, when wealth is exhausted. Should this women survive 
until 93, she would consume Social Security benefits of $20,000 until the end of her life. 
Wealth increases until age 69, after which it declines continuously, reaching zero at age 
93. Under this scenario, the expected present value of bequests is $32,500. Even though 
wealth is exhausted sooner under this scenario, bequests are greater because more wealth 
is held at ages 75–85 when the probability of death is large. 
  Table 2 shows a summary of these kinds of simulations. The table pertains to a 65 
year-old man. In the two left-side panels are results under the assumption that he has no 
bequest motive (no children). In the left-most panel, his initial bequeathable wealth is 
$100,000 and annual Social Security benefits are $10,000. The expected present value 
(discounted at 4% real interest rate) of Social Security benefits (Social Security wealth) is 
$107,600. According to the estimated optimal consumption path, the expected present   8
value of consumption is $193,200 and the expected present value of bequests is just 
$12,800. Thus, the model predicts that 12.8% of initial wealth will be bequeathed, and 
because there is no bequest motive, these bequests are accidental. 
  The next panel shows similar figures, but when Social Security benefits are 
$20,000 each year. Social Security wealth is twice as large, but the expected present 
value of consumption increases by $109,000, which is more than the increase in Social 
Security wealth. Because the lifetime budget constraint must be satisfied, the expected 
present value of bequests must decline, and, indeed, a direct calculation shows that it 
does. Therefore, for this example, an increase in Social Security benefits is entirely 
consumed by the receiving cohorts, and they even consume a little more out of their own 
bequeathable wealth. The net effect is a decrease in bequests. 
  The right two columns have similar results, but now the man is assumed to have 
three children. A comparison of columns 1 and 3, which holds Social Security benefits 
constant but changes the bequest motive, shows that the bequest motive is weak—the 
expected present value of bequests increases by just $200 or 2.6%. We should not expect, 
therefore, that increases in Social Security benefits would cause a change in the expected 
present value of bequests that is much different from the comparisons of columns 1 and 
2, and that is the case. As the last two columns show, the expected present value of 
bequests falls by $2,600 rather than by $2,700, as in columns 1 and 2. Thus, the bequest 
motive causes an additional $100 in bequests out of an increase in the present value of 
Social Security benefits of $107,700.  
  Table 3 has similar results, but they are for a 65 year-old woman. The difference 
in inputs that cause the difference in results is that women face substantially lower 
mortality risk and have greater life expectancy. Thus, Social Security wealth is about 
$15,000 higher. This lower risk causes the optimal consumption level initially to be 
lower, but consumption is achieved over a longer lifespan so that total consumption is 
higher than for a 65 year-old man. Because consumption is initially lower, wealth is held 
for a longer time. Even though more wealth is held, it is held earlier in life when 
mortality risk is fairly low. Thus, compared with a man bequests are lower.   9
  As with the 65 year-old man, the woman’s expected bequests decline when Social 
Security benefits are increased from $10,000 to $20,000 per year. As shown in the right-
hand columns, bequests decrease even when there is a bequest motive. 
  Tables 4 and 5 have results similar to those in Tables 2 and 3, except that different 
parameters are used for the model, those shown in Table 1, column “Hurd (1989).” The 
time rate of discount, , is much lower so that the start of the consumption path is lower, 
causing more wealth to be held. A consequence is that bequests are substantially higher 
even without a bequest motive (left columns), thus 28%–29% of bequeathable wealth is 
accidentally bequeathed. Even so, increasing Social Security causes bequests to decrease 
by $2,200 for the 65 year-old man and $400 for the 65 year-old woman. 
  When there is a bequest motive, an increase in Social Security benefits does cause 
an increase in bequests. In the case of the 65 year-old woman, the increase is by $2,100 
which is an increase of 6.8%. However, Social Security wealth increased $132,900, so all 




Although, in principle, an increase in Social Security benefits could result in substantial 
increases in bequests (whether they are accidental or not), the empirical finding is that 
they do not, or at least not substantially. In fact, under a model of life-cycle consumption 
by singles, which was estimated over two different data sets, bequest actually decrease in 
the absence of a bequest motive. Only in one of the estimated models that allowed for a 
bequest motive did bequests increase, and even then, the increase was trivial. We 
explored many more cases, such as variation in the level of Social Security benefits, the 
number of children, and the age of the single person (not shown). In no simulation did we 
observe any significant increase in bequests in response to an increase in Social Security 
benefits. We conclude that, at least for singles, increases in Social Security benefits are 
unlikely to be offset by bequests. 
Results for couples are unlikely to be substantially different simply because at the 
death of a spouse, about 75% of the wealth goes to the surviving spouse  (Hurd and Smith 
2001). At that point, the surviving spouse follows the consumption path generated by the 
Deleted:  ρ  10
singles’ model. As we have seen, the singles’ model does not produce any important 
bequest offset to an increase in Social Security benefits. 
  An unanswered question, however, is the role of intervivos transfers. They are 
fairly large, and perhaps they would be increased in response to an increase in Social 
Security benefits. To answer that question would require the specification and estimation 
of a considerably more complex model than the one used here.  11
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Interest rate and utility function parameters 
 
  Gan et al (2004)  Hurd (1989) 
r   0.04 0.03 
γ   0.986 1.12 
ρ   0.058 -0.011 
0 α   3.8067e-7 3.8067e-7
* 
1 a   1.0431e-6 1.0431e-6
* 
*Hurd estimated a bequest parameter to indicate any children, 
but not an additional parameter for the number. For that reason 









Bequeathable wealth, Social Security benefits, expected present value of consumption and 
bequests (in thousands) 
65 year-old male, parameters from Table 1 (Gan et al) 
  No children  Three children 







Social Security  
Initial bequeathable wealth  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Initial Social Security benefits  10.0 20.0 10.0 20.0 
Social Security wealth  107.6 215.3 107.6 215.3 
Expected PV consumption  193.2 302.2 193.0 302.1 
Expected PV bequests  12.8 10.1 13.0 10.4 
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Table 3 
Bequeathable wealth, Social Security benefits, expected present value of consumption and 
bequests (in thousands) 
65 year-old female, parameters from Table 1 (Gan et al) 
  No children  Three children 







Social Security  
Initial bequeathable wealth  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Initial Social Security benefits  10.0 20.0 10.0 20.0 
Social Security wealth  122.6 245.2 122.6 245.2 
Expected PV consumption  212.1 335.8 211.9 335.2 
Expected PV bequests  9.8 7.5 10.1 7.7 




Bequeathable wealth, Social Security benefits, expected present value of consumption and 
bequests (in thousands) 
65 year-old male, parameters from Table 1 (Hurd) 
  No children  Three children 







Social Security  
Initial bequeathable wealth  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Initial Social Security benefits  10.0 20.0 10.0 20.0 
Social Security wealth  115.7 231.5 115.7 231.5 
Expected PV consumption  189.5 307.7 188.2 304.1 
Expected PV bequests  27.6 25.4 29.0 29.2 





Bequeathable wealth, Social Security benefits, expected present value of consumption and 
bequests (in thousands) 
65 year-old female, parameters from Table 1 (Hurd) 
  No children  Three children 







Social Security  
Initial bequeathable wealth  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Initial Social Security benefits  10.0 20.0 10.0 20.0 
Social Security wealth  132.9 265.8 132.9 265.8 
Expected PV consumption  206.2 340.3 204.6 336.3 
Expected PV bequests  29.2 28.8 30.9 33.0 
      
 